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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NOS. 42137 & 43590 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) ADA COUNTY NOS.  
) CR 2013-2622 & CR 2013-7755 
v.     ) 
     ) 
JAE HO JUNG,   ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
In consolidated cases, a jury found Jae Ho Jung guilty of two counts of 
possession of a synthetic cannabinoid with the intent to deliver, guilty of one count of 
possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to deliver, and failed to reach a verdict 
on another count of possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to deliver.1  
                                            
1 Mr. Jung’s original Notice of Appeal contained only one of the district court case 
numbers – CR-2013-2622. (Supreme Court docket number 42137).  Since filing his 
Appellant’s Brief in docket number 42137, Mr. Jung has filed a Notice of Appeal timely 
from an amended judgment of conviction entered in the present case.  (R. 43590, pp. 
169-180.)  This Court has entered an order consolidating the appeals allowing Mr. Jung 
to file a separate Appellant’s Brief in docket number 43590, at which point the State will 
be allowed to file a Respondent’s Brief addressing claims raised in both Appellant’s 
Briefs.  See Order Consolidating Appeals, filed October 8, 2015.    
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Mr. Jung asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to act consistently 
with the applicable law, when the court denied Mr. Jung’s request for a withheld 
judgment. 
    
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 Acting on information from patrol and bicycle officers suggesting that synthetic 
cannabinoids were being sold in the Jay Mart, a gas station and convenience store 
located at 16th and State Street in Boise, Detective Andreoli of the Boise Police 
Department went undercover in an attempt to purchase some but he was told by the 
clerk that the Jay Mart does not sell those substances.  (Tr. Trial, p.243, L.17 – p.245, 
L.4.)2  Presumably due to a lack of probable cause to obtain a search warrant, Detective 
Andreoli contacted detectives with the Idaho State Police Alcohol Beverage Control who 
agreed to do a premises check purportedly to ensure that the Jay Mart was complying 
with regulations regarding the sale of alcohol.  (Tr. Trial, p.246, L.24 – p.247, L.11.)  On 
October 25, 2012, law enforcement personnel searched the Jay Mart, found 15 packets 
labeled “Holy Grail” potpourri which contained synthetic cannabinoids, found pipes, 
grinders, and other drug paraphernalia, and detained the owner, Jae Jung.  (Tr. Trial, 
p.331, L.9 – p.332, L.7; p.341, L.5 – p.361, L.2.)  Detective Andreoli asked Mr. Jung, a 
lawful permanent resident born in South Korea (PSI, pp.6-7)3, about the synthetic 
cannabinoids – Mr. Jung responded, in a thick accent, that a white male had dropped 
                                            
2 The bulk of the trial proceedings are contained in the 1,033 page transcript created for 
docket number 42137 and will be cited as “Tr. Trial” in this Brief.  
3 Citations to materials contained in the Presentence Investigation Report, which was 
created for the appeal in docket number 42137, will include the page numbers 
associated with the electronic file containing those materials. 
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them off about a week earlier asking him to hand them out as samples, but he had not 
sold or given any away.  (Tr. Trial, p.453, L.18 – p.455, L.7.)  Officers seized the 
synthetic cannabinoids and some items they considered to be drug paraphernalia and 
Detective Andreoli told Mr. Jung that the items he had were illegal to sell, but they did 
not arrest him at that time.  (Tr. Trial, p.455, L.8 – p.457, L.18; p.563, L.16 – p.565, L.1.) 
 Although a warrant was issued for Mr. Jung’s arrest on February 26, 2013, he 
was not arrested until four months later when informants told detectives that Mr. Jung 
was selling synthetic cannabinoids in the Jay Mart.  (R. 42137, pp.11-13; PSI, p.83.)  
Detectives again entered the Jay Mart, found more pipes and other purported drug 
paraphernalia being sold, arrested Mr. Jung, and found 8 packets of synthetic 
cannabinoids labeled “Krooked Original” on Mr. Jung’s person and within popcorn and 
hot dog bags.  (Tr. Trial, p.462, L.5 – p.505, L.21.)  After being made aware of his right 
to remain silent, Mr. Jung voluntarily spoke with Detective Andreoli and answered every 
question asked of him.  (Tr. Trial, p.506, L.22 – p.519, L.24; Exs. 17, 18.)  Mr. Jung 
stated that a man who called himself “Noah” delivered the synthetic cannabinoids to 
him, describing him as tall and skinny and always wearing glasses.  (Ex. 18.)  “Noah” 
told him that selling the “fake marijuana” was legal in Idaho because selling real 
marijuana was legal in Washington and Colorado, and that other stores around Boise 
sold the same products.  (Ex. 18.)  Mr. Jung admitted, however, that he did not sell the 
synthetic cannabinoids out in the open, only sold it to people he trusted, and did not tell 
his employees that he was selling the product because he was “scared.”  (Ex. 18.)  
Mr. Jung told Detective Andreoli how much he bought the product for, how much he 
sold it for, and how often he sold it.  (Ex. 18.)  Mr. Jung was shown a picture of an 
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individual and asked if it was “Noah”; however, Mr. Jung was unable to say one way or 
the other whether the person pictured was the person he knew as “Noah.”  (Ex. 18.)   
 The jury found Mr. Jung guilty of both possession of a synthetic cannabinoid with 
the intent to deliver and possession of paraphernalia with the intent to deliver, stemming 
from his arrest on April 25, 2013.  (R. 43590, p.92.)4  During the sentencing hearing, 
counsel for Mr. Jung requested that the court withhold judgment and place Mr. Jung on 
probation.  (Tr. Sent, p.29, L.17 – p.30, L.4.)  The district court indicated that it believed 
that Mr. Jung meets two of the requirements necessary for the court to withhold 
judgment pursuant to I.C. § 37-2738(4) – that he had no prior finding of guilt to any drug 
related crimes, and the court had an abiding conviction that he will successfully 
complete the terms of his probation; however, the court felt that it “cannot find that the 
defendant meets criteria (c), that the defendant satisfactorily cooperated with law 
enforcement authorities in the prosecution of drug related crimes of which the defendant 
had previously been involved.”  (Tr. Sent, p.30, L.11 – p.31, L.6; p.33, L.19 – p.34, 
L.22.)  The district court sentenced Mr. Jung to concurrent suspended terms of six 
years, with two and one-half years fixed for possession of synthetic cannabinoids with 
the intent to deliver, and five years, with three years fixed, for possession of 
paraphernalia with the intent to deliver, and placed Mr. Jung on probation for a period of 
five years.  (R. 43590, pp.156-163, 169-177.)5  Mr. Jung filed a timely Notice of Appeal 
                                            
4 The jury also found Mr. Jung guilty of possession of a synthetic cannabinoid with the 
intent to deliver related to his possession of “Holy Grail” on October 25, 2012, but the 
jury could not reach a verdict related to the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia 
with the intent to deliver on that same date.  (R. 42137, p.180.) 
5 In docket number 42137, the district court sentenced Mr. Jung to a concurrent 
suspended unified term of five years, with two years fixed, and placed Mr. Jung on 
probation for a period of five years.  (R. 42137, pp.187-194.)   
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from his Amended Judgment of Conviction in case number 43590.  (R. 43590, pp.169-
180.)    
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion by failing to enter a withheld judgment?  
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Enter A Withheld Judgment 
 
Sentencing decisions are reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion 
standard.  When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court rightly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to 
specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason.  State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).  Mr. Jung asserts that the district 
court’s decision to deny his request for a withheld judgment was based upon a faulty 
understanding of the applicable legal standards. 
Idaho Code § 37-2738 reads, in relevant part, as follows, 
(1) Any person who pleads guilty to, is found guilty of or has a 
judgment of conviction entered upon a violation of the provisions of 
subsection (a), (b), (c) or (e) of section 37-2732, Idaho Code, shall be 
sentenced according to the criteria set forth herein. 
 . . . 
 
(4) When sentencing an individual for the crimes enumerated in section 
(1) of this section, the court shall not enter a withheld judgment unless it 
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
 
(a) The defendant has no prior finding of guilt for any felony, any 
violation of chapter 80, title 18, Idaho Code, or subsection 
(a),(b), (c) or (e) of section 37-2732, Idaho Code, whatsoever; and 
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(b) The sentencing court has an abiding conviction that the 
defendant will successfully complete the terms of probation; and 
 
(c) The defendant has satisfactorily cooperated with law 
enforcement authorities in the prosecution of drug related crimes of 
which the defendant has previously had involvement. 
 
I.C. § 37-2738.  The jury found Mr. Jung was guilty of violating I.C. § 37-2732(a) by 
possessing a non-narcotic schedule I controlled substance (synthetic cannabinoid) with 
the intent to deliver.  Therefore, in order to be eligible for a withheld judgment, all three 
of the criteria enumerated in I.C. § 37-2738(4) must be met. 
 The district court correctly found that Mr. Jung had no prior convictions for any of 
the offenses listed in subsection (a); in fact, Mr. Jung had no prior criminal history 
whatsoever.  (Tr. Sent, p.30, Ls.7-19; PSI, pp.5-6.)  Furthermore, the district court’s 
finding that it had an “abiding conviction that the defendant will successfully complete 
the terms of his probation” is well supported.  (Tr. Sent, p.30, Ls.20-22.)  Mr. Jung 
repeatedly apologized for his behavior and expressed nothing more than a desire to 
stay in the United States so that his wife could continue get the best possible treatment 
for her cancer, and that his two sons (the younger of whom is an American citizen) 
would be able to continue to grow up in the only country they knew.  (Tr. Sent, p.32, 
L.15 – p.33, L.2; Ex. 18, PSI, pp.6-9, 13-16.)  The court’s finding is further supported by 
the fifteen different letters submitted in support of Mr. Jung by people attesting to his 
character, including the fact that he often times would allow homeless people to come 
into his store just to get warm during the freezing winter months, and that he would 
provide those in need with free food and drink.  (PSI, pp.115-129.) 
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 Mr. Jung asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to find that 
he met the third criteria.  The court appeared concerned that there was a lack of a 
factual basis for the court to conclude that Mr. Jung “has satisfactorily cooperated with 
law enforcement authorities in the prosecution of drug related crimes of which the 
defendant has previously had involvement.”  (Tr. Sent, p.30, L.22 – p.31, L.6; p.34, 
Ls.8-16 (quoting I.C. § 37-2738(4)(c)).)  It is not entirely clear whether the district court 
felt that there was no factual basis to conclude that Mr. Jung cooperated with law 
enforcement in the present case, or whether the court felt that Mr. Jung had to have 
previously been involved in drug related crimes for which he satisfactorily cooperated in 
the prosecution of.  In either case, the district court abused its discretion. 
The Idaho Legislature has provided instructions on how to interpret laws it has 
enacted.   
(1) The language of a statute should be given its plain, usual and ordinary 
meaning.  Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the expressed intent 
of the legislature shall be given effect without engaging in statutory 
construction. The literal words of a statute are the best guide to 
determining legislative intent. 
 
(2) If a statute is capable of more than one (1) conflicting construction, the 
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations shall be considered, and 
the statute must be construed as a whole.  Interpretations which would 
render the statute a nullity, or which would lead to absurd results, are 
disfavored. 
 
(3) Words and phrases are construed according to the context and the 
approved usage of the language, but technical words and phrases, and 
such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, 
or are defined in the succeeding section, are to be construed according to 
such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition. 
 
I.C. § 73-113.  Mr. Jung asserts that I.C. § 37-2738(4)(c) is capable of more than one 
conflicting interpretation: 1) that the defendant’s ability to get a withheld judgment 
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depends upon the defendant having prior involvement in drug related crimes for which 
he satisfactorily cooperated in the prosecution of; 2) that the cooperation requirement 
applies only where law enforcement first asks the defendant to cooperate, i.e. that this 
provision will not bar a defendant from obtaining a withheld judgment unless law 
enforcement first asks the defendant to cooperate; or 3) that the cooperation 
requirement applies to the investigation leading to the charge brought in the case for 
which the defendant is being sentenced. 
 The first of these interpretations would lead to absurd results.  If a defendant’s 
eligibility to obtain a withheld judgment depends upon having prior involvement in drug 
related crimes, a defendant who simply had no such prior involvement would not be 
eligible for a withheld judgment and would suffer more draconian, rather than more 
lenient treatment.  Idaho law, however, recognizes that the first offender should be 
granted more lenient treatment than those individuals who have engaged in repeated 
criminal activities.  See State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (1998).  Additionally, 
reading this provision to require the defendant to cooperate with law enforcement 
leaves a defendant’s ability to obtain a withheld judgment to the discretion of law 
enforcement, i.e., if the police choose not to ask the defendant to cooperate, the 
defendant would have no ability to meet this provision.  Such a reading, however, would 
allow the executive branch to, in effect, exercise the power reserved only to the 
legislature to limit the inherent power of a sentencing court to exercise sentencing 
discretion.  See State v. Branson, 128 Idaho 790 (1996).  Thus, to the extent that the 
district court read I.C. § 37-2738(4)(c) as allowing for a withheld judgment only where a 
defendant had a prior history of drug related crimes, law enforcement asked the 
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defendant to cooperate in the prosecution of such crimes, and the defendant 
satisfactorily met this obligation, the district court’s reading is incorrect and the court 
abused its discretion in denying Mr. Jung a withheld judgment by failing to apply the 
applicable legal standards. 
 Mr. Jung asserts that the most reasonable interpretation of I.C. § 37-2738(4)(c)  
is one that recognizes that the defendant must first be given an opportunity to cooperate 
with law enforcement in the prosecution of drug-related crimes in which the defendant 
has been involved.  In other words, where defendants like Mr. Jung have no prior 
involvement in drug related crimes, or where defendants with prior involvement in drug 
related crimes are never asked to cooperate in any prosecution related to those crimes, 
this provision would automatically be met.  Such an interpretation is consistent with the 
axiom that first time offenders should be granted more lenient treatment than those who 
repeatedly violate the law, and that a court’s authority to exercise sentencing discretion 
is not limited by the whims of narcotics detectives. 
 Finally, to the extent that this Court determines that I.C. §  37-2738(4)(c) requires 
a defendant to cooperate with law enforcement in the case for which the defendant is 
being sentenced in order to be eligible for a withheld judgment, Mr. Jung met that 
requirement in the present case.  Simply put, Mr. Jung answered every question that 
law enforcement ever asked of him.  He identified his source by name and gave a 
physical description, and he identified how the transactions occurred including how 
much he paid for the synthetic cannabinoids, how much he sold it for, and how often he 
sold it.  (Ex. 18.)  He was shown a picture of someone who Detective Andreoli 
presumably suspected may have been “Noah” but he was unable to identify the person 
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because “Noah” always wore sunglasses, and because of the inherent problems of 
cross-cultural identification.6  (Ex. 18.)  Law enforcement did not ask him to become a 
confidential informant or otherwise cooperate in the prosecution of anyone else.  
Therefore, Mr. Jung met the all of the requirements set forth in I.C. § 37-2738(4)(c), and 
the district court abused its discretion by failing to grant his request for a withheld 
judgment.  
  
CONCLUSION 
 
Mr. Jung respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction 
and remand his case to the district court with instructions that the court withhold 
judgment while Mr. Jung serves his probationary term. 
 DATED this 31st day of March, 2016. 
 
      /s/_________________________ 
      JASON C. PINTLER 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
                                            
6 Mr. Jung told Detective Andreoli that when he first approached him, Mr. Jung actually 
thought that Detective Andreoli was “Noah” and he also stated that white people look 
the same to him, which is not unexpected.  See State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 594 
n.8 (2011) (citing State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 27 A.3d 872, 907 (2011)). 
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